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JOHN H. BIGGS* 
Because this lecture honors the memory of a great St. Louis journalist, I 
start by acknowledging that the source of my opening quote is a newspaper 
story.  I liked this quote from The Great Crash by John Kenneth Galbraith so 
much, that I read the entire book in order to find this quote. 
Galbraith is not well thought of by professional economists since his 
writing is accessible, witty and based on shrewd insight, rather than multiple 
regression theory.  He is also hopelessly liberal.  I hope you like the following 
passages that introduce the cheery topic of Enron and our other corporate 
scandals.  I personally think it is one of the most elegant paragraphs ever 
written by an economist–although many of you may think that economic prose 
presents a low hurdle for elegance in writing.  He writes: 
In many ways the effect of the crash on embezzlement was more significant 
than on suicide.  To the economist embezzlement is the most interesting of 
crimes.  Alone among the various forms of larceny it has a time parameter.  
Weeks, months, or years may elapse between the commission of the crime and 
its discovery. . . .  At any given time there exists an inventory of undiscovered 
embezzlement in – or more precisely not in – the country’s businesses and 
banks.  This inventory – it should perhaps be called the bezzle – amounts at 
any moment to many millions of dollars.  It also varies in size with the 
business cycle.  In good times, people are relaxed, trusting, and money is 
plentiful.  But even though money is plentiful, there are always many people 
who need more.  Under these circumstances the rate of embezzlement grows, 
the rate of discovery falls off, and the bezzle increases rapidly.  In depression 
all this is reversed.  Money is watched with a narrow, suspicious eye.  The man 
who handles it is assumed to be dishonest until he proves himself otherwise.  
Audits are penetrating and meticulous.  Commercial morality is enormously 
improved.  The bezzle shrinks.1 
The good news is that there is no doubt that the “bezzle” in the U.S. 
economy is now rapidly shrinking.  Unfortunately, our national income 
statistics, which didn’t exist in the 1920s, do not report regularly on this 
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quantity.  It is a serious problem for Alan Greenspan that he does not get a 
daily report on the amount of the “bezzle.”  It would be a good leading 
indicator.  However it would be difficult to gather the data, as most companies 
would be reluctant to report it. 
But let me get more serious.  What was the form of the “bezzle” in the last 
decade of the 1990s?  And just how widespread and large is it?  The title of 
this talk raises that question.  Was Enron a freak occurrence?  If it was, what 
about WorldCom, Global Crossing, Waste Management, Tyco, Cendant, 
Dynergy, RiteAid, Sunbeam, Xerox and now a truly fancy name “Royal 
Ahold?”  This very partial listing suggests Enron was not so freakish. 
Let me answer the questions using public polls.  A competent survey 
showed that 84% of the public believe that every American company engages 
in corporate wrongdoing.2  About half of those believe that many of these 
companies will be exposed.  If that is true, there is a journalistic feast ahead, 
but a disaster for the country.  On the other hand, a shrewd, well-informed 
observer of American Business, Hank McKinnell, the Chair of Pfizer, an 
extremely well-governed company, has written that he is angry at the few 
malefactors, but believes they are “rogues” and that only 1% of American 
companies are so guilty.3  I take a position decisively between these two 
bounds; the malefactors are between Hank’s 1% and the general public’s 
100%. 
Other public survey shockers include results reflecting that the American 
public believes that only 23% of CEO’s can be trusted, which is slightly ahead 
of car dealers at 15%, but far behind military officers and people who run 
small businesses, 75% of whom the American public believes can be trusted.4 
I will approach this analysis by examining just one company—Enron—and 
going through the following aspects of its spectacular failure that seem to me 
to represent system-wide issues for American companies: (1) the pernicious 
aspects of Enron’s basic business model, (2) the flaccid performance of a 
seemingly excellent Board, (3) overdosing on stock options, and (4) Enron’s 
conflicted auditor relationship. 
We now know a good deal about Enron after all the investigations, 
congressional hearings, and even books.  I even have a few anecdotes from my 
personal experience that affect my view of the Enron/Anderson debacle.  
Furthermore, Enron seems to have exhibited more of the system-wide failure 
than did the other corporate scandals. 
 
 2. Street Sweep (CNNfn television broadcast, June 13, 2002). 
 3. Hank McKinnell, “The New Responsibilities of Business Leaders are as Old as 
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January.2003.article.pdf (April 2, 2003). 
 4. See The Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise (Sept. 17, 
2002), available at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf.free/757.pdf (last visited April 2, 2003) 
[hereinafter The Conference Board Report]. 
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The Business Model 
One should start with the primary problem: the failure of the Enron 
business model.  Enron captured, in four major ways, the greatest ambitions of 
the new economy of the 1990s.  First, Enron seemed to demonstrate creative 
and imaginative responses to a new unshackled business—deregulation of the 
staid energy business.  They stepped away from the dull, slow-moving building 
of energy sources in the form of power plants and pipe lines to focus on 
markets, trading, and fast-moving market manipulations.  And why limit them 
to energy?  As Enron developed markets in a variety of products, they saw no 
limit to what they might do. 
Second, they had an extraordinarily high-performance work environment 
with the best and brightest from our finest business schools competing eagerly 
for jobs at Enron.  Enron employees were totally devoted to work, to outdoing 
their competitors and each other, and to doing this with a total commitment to 
their exciting “New Economy” company.5  They believed they were 
revolutionizing the business world and getting fabulously rich in the process. 
The third way they reflected the new business model was that they had 
become a power player in national and local politics.6  Ken Lay and his 
colleagues were movers and shakers in Washington DC, in every state capital, 
and every country of the world. 
The fourth way was Enron’s use of financial engineering.  Enron’s 
business model was also firmly based on financial engineering, another theme 
much admired by the contemporary world.7  Complexity of their off-balance 
sheet structured financing became unfathomable – our CREF analyst 
recommended against buying the stock because “he couldn’t figure out how 
they made money.” 
We should recall how much the business community, the media, the 
Houston and Washington, D.C. social worlds admired, envied, and emulated 
the aggressive, energetic, and fabulously successful style of Ken Lay’s 
creation.  In retrospect, Lay must be viewed as one of the truly great con men 
of the 20th Century. 
The Enron mystique was based on deep and influential views about how a 
“new economy” American business should be run.  Academic finance theorists 
once called for business cultures like that of Enron.  We needed an owner 
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mentality rather than a bureaucratic approach; we needed uncapped pay for 
performance where performance was focused, measurable, and derived from 
management by objectives.  Employee interests were aligned with 
shareholders—the more specific the objectives the better.  Stock options were 
the perfect form of compensation.  The really great CEO took no salary and 
was paid entirely on the basis of the rise in the quoted price in the market for 
his company’s stock.  I say “him” in the masculine advisedly.  Men seem to 
have a gender advantage when it comes to engaging in embezzlement, but 
probably not a total exclusion. 
We now know how flawed the real Enron business model was and how it 
finally became a sham that the leadership of Enron did not acknowledge, even 
to themselves.  If there is any justice in what happened to Ken Lay and his 
associates, it is that they were also wiped out financially by holding their 
Enron stock to the very end.  Their business model has been called hyper-
capitalism.8  The term “hyper” is used in the sense of speed, rapid growth, 
trading instead of building, use of market mechanisms, and very quick 
accumulation of enormous personal fortunes.9 
Another form of hyper-capitalism in the hands of “Chainsaw” Dunlap at 
Sunbeam degenerated into “pathological capitalism,” where he seemed to get 
pleasure from destroying shareholder value through firing competent, 
hardworking people who were needed.10  Sunbeam is another example of the 
widespread perverse effects of the ideas underlying Enron.  The bezzle was 
growing in Enron with few people seeing the disaster that was to come.  The 
ideas behind the Enron business model are widespread in American business, 
but are now being reconsidered by academics, regulators, and especially 
business participants. 
Mike Jensen, a Harvard Business School finance professor, was one of the 
strongest energizing forces behind the new economy in the 1980s.  He is now 
recanting and has become defensive about his ideas at the same time.  He has 
coined a great phrase that overpriced stocks are like managerial heroin.11  If the 
price went up 50% last year, we have to have another rise this year.  How can 
we get it? 
Enron’s electrified culture was paired with a similar one at Arthur 
Andersen.  I will address the Andersen independence issue later.  There is an 
 
 8. See, e.g., James P. Pinkerton, History Confirms It: The Bull Market is Over, NEWSDAY, 
June 18, 2002, at A31. 
 9. Id. (stating that “investors have been getting away with murderous winnings in recent 
years” and commenting on the “risk-taking, sharp practicing nature of globally competitive 
hyper-capitalism.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Jerry Useem, Tyrants, Statesmen, and Destroyers (A Brief History of the CEO), 
FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Nov. 18, 2002, at 82. 
 11. How To Pay Bosses—Michael Jensen Still Thinks He Has The Answer, THE ECONOMIST, 
Nov. 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7248235. 
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important book recently released by Barbara Toffler, entitled Final 
Accounting, Ambition, Greed and the Fall of Arthur Andersen.  She was the 
head of Andersen’s Ethics Practice, which ironically advised only client 
companies on ethics but not Andersen itself.  She describes the gung-ho 
training of Andersen “androids” to make sure they all represented the company 
in exactly the same way.  The clash of culture between the high rolling 
consultants and the dull, beancounting auditors was poisonous. 
Andersen created a giant consulting business, now spun off and called 
Accenture, that was worth many billions of dollars.  But, all that was lost to the 
Andersen auditors and accountants when internal fighting between the cultures 
became self-destroying.  The results are well-known. 
But these cultural traits were not unique to Enron and Andersen.  Many 
companies aspired to match them, or believed they could surpass them.  The 
telecom companies may be the best examples.  A solid company like Corning 
decided to focus itself on producing high-tech telecom cable and got rid of dull 
Corning Ware.  They are now almost out of business.12  A well diversified old 
economy company like Aetna recklessly abandoned the stodgy insurance 
business to become a highly-focused medical care provider.13  They just 
missed going under. 
I could expand endlessly, but the pressure on financial numbers in all of 
these failed enterprises surely generated significant bezzle in the economy. 
Board of Directors 
Let me turn to the second Enron Story, the Board of Directors. 
What is terrifying to many in the corporate governance community—
directors, CEO’s, regulators, stock analysts, accountants and lawyers—is that 
Enron had an apparently excellent Board of Directors that performed horribly.  
“There but for the grace of God go I” is on the minds of countless board 
members.  Which of us could have gone on that board and slowed the train or 
challenged the management, as our textbook theory of corporate governance 
would expect of directors? 
A Stanford University Business School Dean, who was also an accounting 
professor, chaired the audit committee.  Ken Lay must have bragged about that 
appointment over many years.  The board had a nominal split between the 
Chairman of the Board and the CEO.  This is an overrated protection in my 
opinion, but Enron had it.  Did both or either Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling know 
the dangers of what they had created? 
The other board members were able and savvy people.  The board met all 
our most cherished goals for talent and even diversity.  Frank Savage was an 
 
 12. The Re-education of Roger Ackerman, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 17, 2000, at 1. 
 13. Aetna Buys Health Insurer New Firm Would Cover 23 Million People From Wire 
Reports, THE PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 2, 1996, at 1. 
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African-American, a veteran investment analyst with a remarkable background 
heading Equitable’s, and now AXA’s, investment programs.  Wendy Gramm 
(wife of the Senator Gramm) would have been on anyone’s lists of the 10 most 
successful women in finance in the United States, and John Mendelsohn, a 
college classmate and friend of mine, was a brilliant scientist and administrator 
who headed Anderson Memorial in Houston, one of the most prestigious 
cancer centers in the U.S..  Others had excellent backgrounds in corporate 
governance.  They were all clearly independent, by the sternest definitions.  
Yet the most fundamental protection for investors, the Board of Directors, 
utterly failed. 
I can assure you that the Enron Board failure haunts American corporate 
leadership.  As Galbraith says, after the bubble breaks, “Money is watched 
with a narrow, suspicious eye.  The man who handles it is assumed to be 
dishonest until he proves himself otherwise.”14 
Even before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in July 2002,15 the directors of 
public companies had begun probing, questioning, and spending much more 
time on their activities.  This was especially true with regard to their audit 
committees, because so much “bezzle” grew on their watch.  A topic for 
another talk would be the issue of the fundamental imbalance in American 
corporate governance—strong managers represented by powerful CEO’s, weak 
boards as seen at Enron, passive owners, and the day traders and hedge fund 
managers who showed no interest in where Enron was headed. 
Stock Options 
Let me turn to the third source of Enron’s collapse, the very wide practice 
of overdosing on stock options, to continue with Jensen’s reference to 
“management heroin.”  I have recently been a member of a commission set up 
by the Conference Board, called the Commission on Public Trust and Private 
Enterprise.16  Our first and most significant report was on executive 
compensation. 
The Enron compensation plan had all the characteristics that our 
Commission described as “The Perfect Storm.”17  The six dangerous forces 
included a combination of excessive use of options, their speculative nature, 
the laxness of boards in monitoring compensation, the imbalance created by 
compensation consultants, the short-term management view encouraged by 
options, and the bull market that led to unanticipated and truly gross windfall 
 
 14. GALBRAITH, supra note 1, at 138. 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002). 
 16. See generally The Conference Board Report, supra note 4. 
 17. The Conference Board, The Myth of CEO Accountability, (March/April 2003), available 
at http://www.conference-board.org. 
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gains that had little to do with management’s operating performance.  If you 
would like, I will expand on any one of these in the question period. 
I believe that comes to six storms converging rather than the mere three 
that created the 100-foot waves that sank the Andrea Gail off the 
Newfoundland Banks in Sebastian Jungar’s incredible story.18  The overuse of 
stock options was extremely widespread and was clearly an issue for the entire 
American business system. 
Enron’s management focus on the stock price was extraordinary.  When 
the stock passed $50 a share, a $100 bill was placed on every employee’s 
desk.19  This was a sort of spot bonus.  It seems ugly in retrospect.  For every 
dollar rise in the stock price, the already considerable fortunes of Lay, Skilling, 
Fastow, among others, would rise by still more millions.  “Management 
heroin” is an appropriate phrase. 
There is nothing wrong with shareholders getting rich.  After all, investing 
in stocks is a risky business.  Still, let me briefly list the obvious problems with 
stock options. 
(1) There is no downside financial risk.  Every incentive exists for senior 
management to take steps to increase the stock price, but no incentive 
exists to avoid loss. 
(2) Certainly, dividends should be avoided if all of the focus is on the 
stock price; they provide cash to the shareholder, but they reduce the 
price of the stock.  So, it is no surprise that dividend returns declined 
dramatically during the 1990s. 
(3) Leverage is great because the price will rise and there are tax 
advantages.  But the stock becomes much more risky.  Like the 
perverse incentives in our S & L debacle, the stock option gave 
senior management the following simple strategy: gun the company 
with borrowed money.  If it works, the senior management gets a 
fabulous payoff; if it fails, no financial loss for management results, 
but they give the company back to the shareholders.  That was called 
looting or exploiting, and in the 1980s, S & L executives who 
followed that strategy went to jail.  Again, is it surprising that 
American companies are significantly more leveraged today than in 
1990, and many believe dangerously so. 
(4) Also, should not senior management have some minimum threshold 
of returns before they get a huge payoff?  For example, should they 
not, at least, give the shareholders the risk free rate of return on 
 
 18. SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM: A TRUE STORY OF MEN AGAINST THE SEA 
(1997). 
 19. Nobody Went Like Enron: Failed Energy Firm Spent Freely on Luxury and Image, J. 
REC., Feb. 28, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4934187. 
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government bonds before they get their millions—or even more 
logically, match some index of stock market returns. 
(5) And finally, why, in a rising market, due to the dramatic decline in 
interest rates during the 1980s and 1990s, should executives receive 
millions of dollars of “compensation” when the money should have 
gone to, say, Alan Greenspan or Paul Volcker? 
I believe stock option abuse was extremely widespread.  I haven’t 
mentioned the phony accounting by which stock options were encouraged.  
Eye-popping compensation numbers had a greater impact on public distrust 
than any other corporate action.  Our Commission set up by the Conference 
Board outlined the best practices that would go a long way toward curing those 
problems.  I believe many companies have voluntarily moved forward.  But 
clearly, a major emerging force behind the creation of “bezzle” was this 
extraordinary compensation form. 
Auditing 
Let me conclude with the auditing of Enron.  There has been much dispute 
about the independence of auditors in recent years.  Arthur Levitt was mostly 
defeated by the opposition of the accounting profession when he tried to 
address this problem.  But, consider Arthur Andersen and Enron. 
First, Andersen had been Enron’s auditor for more than a decade, in effect 
during Enron’s entire “new economy” existence.  In short, they had always 
been Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling’s auditor.  Secondly, Enron’s financial 
management was permeated by former Andersen partners and managers.  
Thirdly, Andersen received fabulous fees for doing non-audit work at Enron, 
bringing their total fees to $47.5 million a year.20  With growth expected at 
minimally double digit rates, the capitalized present value of that annual 
amount would be valued by Andersen at $500 million—$1 billion dollars—a 
serious “asset.”  I can assure you that accountants know how to compute the 
value of a perpetuity. 
Fourth, Andersen did all the internal auditing work for Enron.  Fifth, 
Andersen went well beyond tax compliance in providing aggressive tax and 
accounting advice for the infamous off-balance sheet asset structure of Enron.  
They then audited that structure and found no difficulty with it.  These five 
abuses of the idea of independence formed another kind of perfect storm. 
Did anyone raise a question about Andersen’s independence?  I can assure 
you no one in the leadership of the accounting profession did raise, or would 
have raised, a question.  I sparred with them in a Senate Banking Committee 
hearing on this issue and they were deeply offended at my questioning their 
integrity by suggesting that such conflicts might impair their independence. 
 
 20. Flynn McRoberts and Delroy Alexander, ‘1-stop’ tactic casts cloud on Andersen, CHI. 
TRIB., Mar. 4, 2002, at pg. 1. 
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Did Enron’s Audit Committee raise a question?  Did the distinguished 
Stanford Dean see any problem?  None — that is, at least on the record.  Why 
didn’t some of the highly compensated stock analysts whose research reports 
puffed Enron stock ask about Andersen’s independence?  They didn’t have the 
wit to do so because they also were fooled when shown through the Potemkin 
Village trading floor at Enron. 
I have one personal anecdote.  I am a trustee of the International 
Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, which raised money to support 
the new international standard-setting mechanism two years ago.  I served on 
the fund raising committee with Paul Volcker.  Paul asked Ken Lay for an 
Enron contribution, as we did all major U.S. companies.  They ended up 
pledging about half of what we asked.  You will recall that David Duncan was 
the senior partner of Arthur Andersen in Houston overseeing the Enron audit.  
In the media disclosures of Duncan’s famous e-mails, there was one to the 
Chicago office of Andersen asking if Ken Lay’s gift to the Foundation would 
assure Enron influence over the standards to be adopted.21 
I make two personal observations.  The question obviously shows the 
venality of Lay and Enron, or simply a vivid example of using “new economy” 
morality to buy political power.  Secondly, it shows extraordinary naiveté on 
Duncan’s part.  In Accounting 101, students learn about the accounting 
standards setting process, and the extreme efforts made to keep it independent. 
What kind of senior partner had Andersen put in charge of a risky, high 
rolling account, with fees of $55 million a year, who had to seek guidance on 
such a question from his superiors in Chicago?  Significantly, there was no e-
mail response.  One can imagine the unrecorded but blistering telephone call. 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the new federal statute, creates strong powers for the new 
accounting oversight board.22  There is hope in that government response, 
despite the fact that most of us fear the establishment of a new federal 
regulatory agency. 
Other lessons from Enron concern the responsibility of the legal profession 
in advising and abetting Enron management.  Investment bankers are also 
called on the carpet.  But, the American public has the right, especially, to 
focus on the auditors’ role.  The auditor’s specific job in our economy, 
sanctioned by the securities laws as a requirement for all public firms, is to 
limit the bezzle.  They failed not only at Enron, but at many other companies.  
Between stock option abuse and the shock of failed audits, the public has come 
to distrust the whole system.  We have much painful work to do with major 
changes in many of our most prestigious and respected institutions. 
 
 21. Enron Lay: Won’t Appear Today, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK: THE HOTLINE, Feb. 
14, 2002, at 11. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
960 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:951 
The broader question is how did we come to this state?  What happened to 
corporate values and ethics in the 1980s and 1990s that led to such widespread 
abuse?  The infamous Jack Grubman has a neat explanation: “a conflict [of 
interest] is now a synergies.”23 
I see us as having moved from a senior management sense of fiduciary 
duty and trust to a system of doing whatever the market permits, or a, “what I 
can get into my contract that will benefit me?” attitude.  Everyone else does it.  
Or, where does it say I can’t do it? 
We could all list dozens of other Wall Street and American business 
practices that companies performed in the 1990s that we now see for what they 
were.  IPO allocations were bribes, synergistic combination of commercial and 
investment banking led to abuses that Glass-Steagall prevented, corporate 
charitable giving was used to support personal benefits, and corporate-owned 
life insurance, once a marginal question, became a huge one as “janitor 
insurance.”  We could go on. 
So far, the first decade of the 21st century has been the hangover decade.  
We all have splitting headaches from our 401(k) losses, we deferred plans for 
our retirement, and we subject ourselves to personal second-guessing, asking 
questions such as, “why didn’t we sell our stocks when the bubble was so 
obvious?” 
I can assure you that during our hangover decade, “[m]oney [will be] 
watched with a narrow, suspicious eye.  The man who handles it [will be] 
assumed to be dishonest until he proves himself otherwise.  Audits [will be] 
penetrating and meticulous.  Commercial morality [will be] enormously 
improved.  The bezzle will shrink.”24 
I suppose that is the good news. 
 
 
 23. Peter Elstrom, The Power Broker: From His Wall Street Perch, Jack Grubman Is 
Reshaping Telecom and Stirring Up Controversy, BUSINESS WEEK, May 15, 2000, at 11. 
 24. GALBRAITH, supra note 1. 
